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At present, Colombia is the largest coca-producing country in the world. About seventy 
percent of the total area under coca cultivation worldwide is in this country. The 
Colombian government has responded to this challenge in two different ways. On the one 
hand, it has implemented forced eradication activities, such as aerial spraying, to destroy 
coca crops. This strategy has been largely criticized by scholars and local people for its 
short-term results and its negative impacts on coca-producing communities and the 
environment. On the other hand, the government has executed alternative development 
(AD) programmes aimed at addressing economic and social obstacles in these 
communities while providing them with productive alternatives to coca crops. This 
research aimed to analyse the effectiveness of AD programmes considering a key aspect 
in their implementation, which is the participation of the communities involved. To 
achieve this, this research project explored the effectiveness of the current AD 
programme, the National Comprehensive Plan for the Substitution of illicit crops (PNIS) 
through the lens of participatory approaches to development. The research found that the 
participation of the communities in the PNIS and other previous AD programmes in 
Colombia has been limited. In some scenarios, participation has been used as a buzzword 
on working papers rather than a real means to empower communities and build 
sustainable alternatives.  
 
Despite its PNIS stated purpose of addressing the limitations of past AD programmes; in 
practice, it has not shown clear differences with those past experiences. The government’s 
short-term approach of reducing coca crops in the shortest possible time has been imposed 
to the detriment of a long-term objective that seeks to transform the regions and guarantee 
the well-being of the communities affected by the crops. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Colombia has been an important player in the international illicit drug market in recent 
decades. About 70% of the total area currently under coca cultivation worldwide is in 
Colombia. The Colombian government has taken a range of measures to confront drug 
trafficking and its impact on the economic and social development of the country with 
differing levels of success (Rincón-Ruiz, Correa, León & Williams, 2016). Many of these 
measures have been implemented in an uncoordinated manner and have favoured forced 
eradication strategies over more development-oriented alternatives, as much of the 
analysis of counternarcotic policies merely uses the number of hectares under illicit 
cultivation as an indicator of success. This is despite calls by activists, locals and the 
academic community to analyse the drug problem from a development perspective. This 
research project addresses this gap by exploring the effectiveness of the current National 
Comprehensive Plan for the Substitution of illicit crops in Colombia through the lens of 
participatory approaches to development in order to explore the quality of the community 
participation in this programme as well as the role of community participation in the 
overall effectiveness of these interventions in improving communities’ livelihoods. 
 
One of the sections of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and 
the FARC-EP guerrillas was the design of the Comprehensive National Plan for the 
Substitution of Crops for Illicit Use (PNIS). Through this plan, the aim was to offer a 
definitive solution to the thousands of Colombian families who depend on crops for illicit 
use. These communities are among the most vulnerable in the country. Contrary to what 
may be thought about the profitability of this illicit economy, families living in areas with 
coca crops face great vulnerability and their quality of life is very low compared to most 
of the rural and urban population (Ideas para la Paz, 2018). Most of these families are 
made up of young people (forty-one per cent of the total population is under 19 years of 
age) and half of the population are women. These people have been excluded from the 





Considering the importance of providing coca-growing families with a long-term 
solution, this work aims to contribute to existing knowledge of AD programmes in 
Colombia by exploring their effectiveness on improving the livelihoods of coca-growing 
communities based on participatory approaches to development. To fulfil this aim, this 
study seeks to answer the next research question: How effective have the Colombian 
government’s AD voluntary substitution programmes been in improving the livelihoods 
of coca-growing communities? To guarantee a structured and comprehensive answer, a 
set of four research objectives were proposed, namely:  
 
• To explore the impacts of AD voluntary substitution programmes implemented 
by the Colombian government on the livelihoods of coca-growing communities. 
• To identify what participation has happened in the AD voluntary substitution 
programmes in Colombia. 
• To investigate the role of participation in the effectiveness of AD voluntary 
substitution programmes in Colombia. 
• To consider why the AD approaches have or have not been effective in improving 
people’s livelihoods in Colombia. 
 
This chapter has given an overview of the research and research report. In the second 
chapter I give historical overview of the main strategies that the Colombian government 
has implemented to address the problem of crops for illicit use in the country as well as 
some political and historical background of the country. This section will analyse the 
obstacles and achievements of the AD programmes implemented prior to the start of the 
PNIS. In the third chapter, the theoretical framework of the investigation will be outlined. 
An account will be given of the different participatory approaches to development, 
highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. In the fourth chapter the methodology of this 
research will be explained. In order to carry out this research project, interviews with 
experts were conducted, as well as an extensive document analysis. The fifth chapter 
includes an analysis of the data found, regarding PNIS, through the lens of participatory 
approaches to development. Finally, in the sixth chapter the final findings and conclusions 




Chapter 2: Coca Cultivation and Anti-Narcotic Strategies in Colombia 
 
This chapter aims to provide background information about anti-narcotic strategies in 
Colombia and explain the context in which coca production has become a major issue in 
the country. First, I will explain the historical and political context of Colombia during 
recent decades. This will allow the reader to have a clear understanding of the surge of 
some of the main issues discussed in this research. This brief explanation includes 
essential topics to better understand Colombia at its most rural as well as the internal 
armed conflict present in the country. This, in turn, will clarify why coca production has 
found a perfect setting to grow here. Then, I will provide a historical overview of the two 
strategies that the government has used to tackle coca production and drug trade, namely, 
forced eradication strategies and alternative development (AD) programmes. Even 
though this research project has focused on analysing the participatory aspect of AD 
programmes, it is fundamental to know why forced eradication strategies do not provide 
sustainable development outcomes since both policies compete for funding and other 
resources. Finally, the chapter explains the impacts, obstacles, and limitations that AD 
programmes and participation have had during past experiences in the country. 
 
2.1 Background on Colombia 
Colombia (Republic of Colombia) is a country located in South America. It is bounded 
on the east by Venezuela, at the southeast by Brazil, at the west by the Pacific Ocean, at 
the North by the Caribbean Sea, at the northwest by Panamá, and at the South by Ecuador 
and Perú. The country is divided into 32 territorial departments and its capital district is 
Bogotá. According to the latest projections, there are more than 50 (fifty) million 
Colombians (DANE, 2020). Most of them living in the urban areas of the country (81%) 






2.1.1 Conflict in Colombia: Historical Background.  
 
Colombia has suffered from an internal armed conflict more than half a century old. For 
the past seventy years, the country has not fully experienced political stability due to the 
complexity and continuous evolution of its internal conflict. The origins of this conflict 
can be traced to the unequal distribution of land and the lack of spaces for participation 
after the independence from Spain in 1810 (CIDOB, 2017). According to Galindo, 
Restrepo & Sanchez (as cited in Bassols, 2016), current Colombian society still reflects 
several of the segregationist elements typical of colonial times when an upper social class 
imposed its world views on the lower classes mainly formed by Amerindians and African 
slaves. They also state that this imposition occurred through oppression and low social 
mobility. These segregationist elements were later inherited by the newly independent 
nation (Hoberman & Socolow, 1986). 
 
In the 19th century, the first two political parties were formed in Colombia, the 
conservative and liberal parties. With opposing views on the country, both political 
parties fought civil wars during part of the 19th century and lasted until half of the 20th 
century (Bailey, 1967). During this period, the conflict worsened due to the country’s 
poor economic situation and the subsequent assassination of the liberal presidential 
candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. After this last event, the country experienced one of the 
most violent periods in its history, named ‘El Bogotazo’ (Davis, 1994). This period ended 
when both parties agreed to alternate the government of the country every four years (for 
sixteen years). However, the agreement did not include any other political movements. 
This lack of spaces for free political participation and socioeconomic exclusion, 
especially of minority groups and peasants, encouraged the origin of leftist guerrilla 
groups in the country, including the recently demobilized FARC-EP, the M-19 







2.1.1.1 Actors of the conflict.  
Leftist guerrilla groups: The origins of these guerrilla groups were due to differentiated 
regional and historical situations (CIDOB, 2017). However, they all justified violence as 
the only way to transform society. The FARC-EP, the largest guerrilla group in the 
country, was demobilized in 2016 after signing a peace agreement with the Colombian 
government. The formulation and implementation of the PNIS was part of that agreement. 
Currently, the ELN is the only active guerrilla group in the country and operate mainly in 
rural areas. Among its main criminal activities are extortion, drug trafficking and attacks 
on national infrastructure (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). 
 
Right wing paramilitaries: These are extreme right-wing illegal armed groups. Most 
emerged in the 1980s as illegal armed groups financed by wealthy landowners, small 
industrialists, and traffickers with the aim of confronting the actions of the guerrillas and 
communism (CIDOB, 2017). Most of the paramilitary groups demobilized in 2006, and 
the remainder are now known as criminal gangs. 
 
Security Forces: These are the official security forces in Colombia (soldiers, police, air 
force, etc). According NGO Human Rights Watch (2015), there have been cases of human 
rights violations perpetuated by Colombian official security forces in recent years.  
 
Organized Crime: After the dismantling of drug cartels in Colombia in the 1990s, the 
main criminal structures of drug trafficking moved to Central America and Mexico 
(CIDOB, 2017). In Colombia, the guerrillas and criminal gangs now coordinate the 
business in the country. 
 
Drug trafficking: During the 1980s, the country experienced deep economic 
transformations, going from being a coffee-growing country to a mining and coca-
growing country (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). These dynamics created 
incentives to the main actors of the conflict. Drug trafficking shaped the conflict in the 
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country as it has allowed guerrillas, paramilitary groups and criminal gangs to finance 
their illicit activities and then get power in the areas where they frequent.  
 
Victims: The civilian population has been victim of the armed conflict in many ways and 
by all the different actors mentioned above. People in rural areas, especially minority 
groups and peasants, have disproportionately paid the price for the internal war (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2013). 
 
U.S.A: The United States has played an essential role in the country's armed conflict. 
Colombia is the main ally of this country in the region, and a large part of this relationship 
is based on cooperation to confront drug trafficking and illegal armed groups (especially 
after the September 11 attacks) (Buxton, 2015). Through USAID, the United States has 
provided Colombia with resources to develop alternative development programmes in 
communities affected by conflict and drug trafficking (Vargas, 2011). However, Álvarez 
(2005) argues that despite funding designated to these programmes, they have not been 
concerned with improving people's quality of life. She notes that, instead, these 
interventions have focused, initially, on controlling the spread of communism and, 
currently, on controlling illicit crops. At present, the most important indicator for the U.S. 
is the reduction of illicit crops, regardless of the strategy used. This was recently 
evidenced by the threat, by the administration of the Trump government, to decertify 
Colombia in its fight against drugs after reporting a historic increase on coca production 
in 2017 (The New York Times, 2019). Pressure from the United States often favours the 
use of forced eradication strategies such as aerial spraying by the Colombian government 
(Peceny & Durnan, 2006; Dávalos & Dávalos, 2020). 
 
Colombian government: The Government of Colombia is a republic with a separation of 
powers into executive, judicial and legislative branches.  Understanding the changes in 
this government in recent decades is important for the research. Álvaro Uribe Vélez was 
president of Colombia during the periods 2002-2006 and 2006-2010. His government was 
characterized by the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking. In the presidential 
periods 2010-2014 and 2014-2018, Juan Manuel Santos, former defence minister during 
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the Uribe government and sole recipient of the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize, governed the 
country with a programme focused on peace talks with the FARC guerrillas. In 2016, the 
peace agreement was signed, but this later had modifications since a plebiscite did not 
pass where most voters said no to the agreement. The biggest opponent of the agreement, 
and promoter of the vote for No, was former President Uribe, who suggested that ‘Santos 
was seeking peace at any cost’. In 2018, supported by his mentor (former President 
Uribe), Iván Duque Márquez wins the country's presidency. Duque’s campaign was based 
on strong opposition to the peace accords with the FARC guerrillas. 
 
2.2 Historical background on coca-crop production in Colombia. 
 
The production of the coca plant for drug trafficking purposes commenced in Colombia 
at the end of the 1970s (Thuomi, 2002). During this period, several international and local 
dynamics generated an environment conducive to the emergence of drug trafficking in 
some rural areas of the country. Among the international aspects that facilitated this boom 
were the strong demand from Europe and the United States, the large dividends of the 
drug trade, as well as the illegal commercial routes already established for smuggling 
(Giraldo & Lozada, 2008). Locally, the areas that were initially impacted by coca 
production in Colombia were characterized by the high levels of poverty among their 
inhabitants who, for the most part, were farmers displaced from other areas of the country 
due to a lack of economic opportunities (Thuomi, 2002). In addition to this, the presence 
of the state in these isolated regions had been, until this point, very weak or nil (Robinson, 
2013). This last aspect is also aggravated by the presence of illegal armed groups such as 
guerrillas, paramilitaries and drug gangs. These illegal armed groups, in seeking to benefit 
from the drug production and distribution chains, have competed against the government 
and/or each other for control of these strategic territories (Ramírez, 2017). This dynamic 
has created a vicious cycle of violence in the rural areas of the country, and that, in turn, 
has generated serious impacts on the social, political and economic structures of the 
communities affected by coca crops (Pinzón-Tovar, 1994). These affected areas are 
mainly controlled by illegal armed groups who put their own interests above the common 




The last decade of the 20th century was a key period in the history of drug trafficking and 
production in Colombia. During this time, the production of the coca leaf sharply 
increased in the country (Cruz & Chaparro, 2017). The drug trafficking industry in the 
Colombian territory, until then, had essentially focused on the final phase of the drug 
production chain, even though there were areas in the country suitable to grow coca. 
Colombian drug cartels mainly managed the process of transforming coca leaf into 
cocaine. Much of the coca leaf, however, was not grown in Colombia but was imported 
from Bolivia and Peru (Dion & Russler, 2008). After the efforts made by the government 
of the United States to eradicate illicit crops in these countries, coca production found in 
Colombia a social, geographical and economic context suitable for its expansion 
(Thuomi, 2002). Thus, coca production in the country went from around 40 thousand 
hectares of coca in 1990 to roughly 164 thousand hectares of land under coca cultivation 
by the year 2000. Since then, and despite efforts by the Colombian government, the 
production of illicit crops has remained a significant obstacle for the development of the 
rural areas of the country. In 2018, according to the Colombian drug observatory, there 
were illicit crops in 22 of the 32 providences of the country. In 2018, the number of 
hectares under coca crops was 169 thousand, which accounted for a slight fall after 
breaking a historical high with a total of 171 hectares of illicit cultivation in 2017 
(UNODC & Government of Colombia, 2019). 
 
While some other Andean countries such as Bolivia and Peru have large indigenous 
populations, Colombia has significantly fewer. In the former countries, most of the coca 
leaf production destinated for illicit use has been in the hands of these indigenous people, 
for whom coca leaf chewing has always been part of their cultural heritage and identity 
(Pfeiffer, 2013). In Colombia, indigenous communities represent only about 4.4% of the 
country's population (National Administrative Department of Statistics -DANE-, 2019), 
and only some of these groups have coca consumption as a tradition. Because of this, 
from the 1970s to the present, most of the coca production in Colombia has been in the 
hands of poor families of farmers. This is not to say that minority groups have not been 
affected by coca production. In fact, both indigenous and afro-Colombian communities 
have disproportionally suffered the consequences of drug trafficking in later years 
(Rincón-Ruíz & Kallis, 2013). This situation is attributed to the dynamics of this illegal 
economy as well as the government’s punitive attempts to control the trade. The 
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eradication efforts of the national army, for example, have pushed illicit crops to 
increasingly poor and remote areas of the country and, in many cases, to natural reserves 
or areas with special indigenous or afro-Colombian jurisdiction (UNDOC & Government 
of Colombia, 2015). In some of these areas, eradication activities cannot be carried out in 
the same way as they are done in the rest of the country. Indigenous communities, for 
example, have the right to prior consultation before any fumigation actions are planned 
by the government. This situation is exploited by armed groups, to the detriment of the 
environment and indigenous and afro-Colombian communities. In 2018, around half of 
the area with illicit crops (47%) in Colombia were located in these territories with special 
jurisdiction (UNODC & Colombian Government, 2019).  These armed groups also take 
advantage of the already vulnerable situation of these minority groups who, together with 
the farmers located in cultivation areas, have had to participate in this illegal industry 
through both coercion and necessary economic support. This is because of the lack of 
state presence to provide communities in these areas with peace, security and public 
services. 
 
2.3 Social and political impacts of coca crops in rural communities.  
 
Even though this ‘short-term economy’1 has allowed coca growers to meet some of their 
basic needs, the dynamics surrounding coca production has had important negative effects 
on different social and political institutions of the coca-growing communities. One of the 
social impacts that the drug trade has brought to these populations is the loss of traditional 
agricultural production. There are cases where indigenous communities have even had to 
face food shortages because of the new production patterns (Healy, 1985). Because of 
these impacts, Bagley (1985) also suggests that the survival of indigenous ’cultural assets 
is at risk due to both the presence of drugs and the violence employed by drug lords. The 
violence generated by the presence of illegal armed groups has also affected the 
organizational capacity and active leadership of the communities, who face great security 
challenges when they try to make their voices heard (Velez & Lobo, 2019). This last 
impact shows us how the dynamics of coca production greatly restrict the freedom and 
 
1 It refers to a production activity that only provides people with financial support to respond to their 
immediate needs.   
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political participation of the affected communities. Once illicit crops invade the territory 
of these communities it is difficult for villagers to get rid of them as armed groups provide 
protection to plantations through violence and intimidation (Huezo, 2017). 
 
2.4 Forced Eradication Strategies in Colombia 
 
The Colombian Government has adopted different measures to confront this 
phenomenon, and its impact on the economic and social development of the country, with 
different levels of success. Among these efforts two contrasting anti-drug policies can be 
distinguished: those aimed at the forced eradication of illicit crops (e.g. aerial spraying) 
and those of voluntary substitution of illicit crops through alternative development 
programmes (Vargas, 2002).  Much of the current literature on these policies pays 
particular attention to the negative effects of forced eradication activities, such as aerial 
spraying, on the environment, agriculture, governance and other social aspects of the 
affected communities (Navarrete-Frías & Thoumi, 2005; Rincón-Ruiz, Correa, León & 
Williams, 2016; Camacho & Mejía, 2017).  This approach to dealing with the drug 
problem has been subjected to considerable criticism by the academic community over a 
number of years. Critics of this strategy question its ability to eliminate coca production 
permanently. Dion & Russler (2008), for example, point out that the eradication of coca 
crops through aerial spraying has only generated results in the short term. Indeed, coca 
production in Colombia has remained relatively stable over time, although with periods 
of boom and bust (Ideas para la Paz, 2019).  
 
Despite the social, health and environmental consequences2 highlighted by locals, 
activists and academic community, until 2015 Colombia was the only country in the 
world where aerial fumigation of illicit crops was allowed (Camacho & Mejía, 2017; Van 
Bruggen et al., 2018; Huezo, 2017). Destruction of coca crops through aerial spraying 
generates important social disruption among communities who solely depend on this 
economic activity to survive (Huertas, 2018). Coca-growing families face tremendous 
 
2 Glyphosate, the chemical used to eradicate coca crops by the Colombian government, has shown to have 
negative effects on human health and environment. In 2015, The World Health Organization (WHO) 
reclassified this herbicide as “probably cancerogenic to humans”.    
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uncertainty when they get their only livelihoods destroyed without warning. The 
prohibition of this practice in 2015 was due to a ruling by the country's constitutional 
court based on scientific findings suggesting that glyphosate, the chemical used for 
spraying, increases the risk of cancer (Fritschi et al, 2015). However, following recent 
threats by the Trump administration to cut American aid to Colombia if drug production 
is not reduced (The New York Times, 2019), the current Colombian government has been 
pushing to resume aerial spraying actions. The government's proposal to resume this 
practice is currently under evaluation by the court. 
 
The push to resume forced eradication programmes to control drug crops is consistent 
with the history of the US government in the region, which has strongly supported these 
approaches in producing countries as part of its ‘war on drugs’. This strategy is based on 
a criminalization approach to drugs. The rationale behind this approach is that forced 
eradication efforts can reduce the supply of cocaine to such an extent that the consequent 
increase in the final price of the drug forces consumers to leave the market (Pacini & 
Franquemont, 1985). Likewise, through the tightening of judicial measures against 
producers and consumers, it seeks to create enough disincentives to discourage the 
participation of people in this industry (Buxton, 2015).  
 
Yet, the literature on the effectiveness of anti-drug policies highlights several weaknesses 
of this criminalization approach. DiNardo (1993), for instance, fails to find any significant 
effect of induced-enforcement measures on the price of cocaine and, therefore, on the 
demand of end users. Some researchers claim that since the supply costs of producing 
cocaine are so low compared to the retail price of the drug, it is easy for drug dealers to 
absorb the costs posed by eradication activities and thus stabilize the final price (Moreno-
Sanchez, Kraybill & Thompson, 2003). Similarly, the literature has identified a ‘balloon 
effect’ in the production of coca, which is attributed to the inelastic demand for this drug 
(Rincón-Ruiz & Kallis, 2013). Given the high profitability of this industry (due to the low 
supply costs), when production is reduced in one region as a result of forced eradication 
actions, the resulting unmet demand generates enough incentives to start growing coca 




Despite criticism, this criminalization approach continues to be promoted by the United 
States both inside and outside its territory. This way of looking at the drug problem took 
hold after the attacks of September 11, when the US government began to consider the 
drug business as a threat to national security. The new argument behind these concerns is 
that drug trafficking provides large profits to criminal groups which, in turn, translates 
into the dangerous ability of these groups to control institutions and territories (Buxton, 
2015). This reasoning was quickly adopted in Colombia due to its known internal conflict, 
which has been worsened due to the presence of drugs. Thus, since 2001, Colombia has 
seen a convergence of both the war on drugs and the war on counterinsurgents (Ramírez, 
2017). 
 
In Colombia, the drug criminalization approach has particularly affected small farmers 
who have taken up coca crops. Often living under already precarious living conditions, 
farmers are vulnerable to the economic stability that the efficiencies of the drug market 
offer. In the last decades, these communities have also had their vulnerabilities 
compounded by the fumigation of their crops without prior notice to threats of loss of 
their property titles by the Colombian Government (Huezo, 2017; Ramirez, 2017). 
Likewise, as will be discussed in the next section, farmers growing coca are expected to 
bear enormous risks to their livelihoods in order to participate in aid funded alternative 
development programmes that require the initial eradication of their illicit crops which, 
in many cases, are their only means of economic support. This denotes a clear 
misunderstanding of the causes by which small producers started drug crops in the first 
place. Under the criminalization approach, alternative development programmes, such as 
crop substitution, take a back seat against forced eradication actions that seek immediate 
results. Buxton (2015) conceives of this situation as a ‘great disconnect’ because instead 
of recognizing the cultivators as victims of the dynamics of drug trafficking, the policy 
makers see them as criminals or collaborators of organized crime and insurgent groups 






2.5 Alternative Development (AD) in Colombia: Illicit crop substitution 
programmes.  
 
Before analysing how alternative development (AD) has been implemented in Colombia, 
it is worth clarifying how this concept is commonly used within the Colombian context. 
For those who are involved in international development, AD is normally understood as 
the process of empowering disenfranchised groups through the creation of opportunities 
that, considering local contexts, allow them to have greater control over their own lives 
and well-being (Friedmann, 1992; Chambers, 1997). Within the context of illicit crop 
reduction programmes, however, there are different approaches to the concept of AD. In 
Colombia, Sánchez (2005) identifies up to six different visions of the concept of AD. In 
general terms, we can identify 2 main approaches to the concept of alternative 
development in the country. On the one hand, there is the approach promoted mainly by 
the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), which defines alternative development as a process of sustainable and 
participatory rural development for regions with the presence of illicit crops and which is 
part of the anti-drug and national rural development policies. On the other hand, as 
pointed out by Sánchez, AD is part of a militarised security strategy against the drug trade 
and it is mainly promoted by the US government. Here, alternative development only 
makes sense to the extent that it allows the objectives of reducing illicit crops to be met. 
Under this approach, the metric used to measure the policy's success is merely the 
reduction of hectares with illicit crops (Buxton, 2015). This situation puts alternative 
development strategies at a disadvantage compared to forced eradication policies, since 
the latter offer results in the short term. Thus, in the face of these more ‘efficient’ methods, 
AD programmes are often understood only as strategies to alleviate the impacts that 
fumigation and forced eradication are having on rural communities (Vargas, 2011).  
 
In Colombia, these different visions of alternative development have been adopted at 
different times during the last few decades. Pressure from the United States government 
has greatly influenced the way in which the drug problem is addressed in the country in 
last decades. Each government elected in Colombia has adopted its own alternative 
development approach and programmes in their own ways of responding to this pressure. 
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As a result, AD programmes in the country have not followed a continuous 
implementation process which has had consequences on their ability to deliver the 
promise of long-term results.  
 
The research for this report focuses primarily on the current "Comprehensive National 
Programme for the Substitution of Illicit Crops" (PNIS3), which was created in the context 
of the Peace Agreement between the Colombian government and FARC guerrillas in 
2016. References will also be made to previous AD crop substitution programmes. This 
is in order to make comparisons and provide an overview of the results of the crop 
substitution programmes in the country. These previous attempts are relevant, considering 
that the development of the AD policy in Colombia is not necessarily linear nor does it 
follow a predefined framework. On the contrary, the reasoning behind these policies 
usually changes depending on the national and international political context. 
 
Although alternative development programmes in Colombia have not adopted fully 
differentiated strategies over time (as there are policy tools and arguments that come and 
go between them), there are historical events that have marked important paradigm shifts 
in drug policy. Among these important historical events are the launching of Plan 
Colombia in the year 2000 (which existed until 2015) and, more recently, the signing of 
the Peace Agreement in 2016. 
 
Plan Colombia was originally conceived in 1999 and aimed to eradicate crops of illicit 
use and strength state presence in rural areas of the country. This plan was supported by 
the United States government as part of its "war on drugs”4, and included diverse policies 
to reduce coca crops. However, among all those strategies, AD programmes as well as 
policies aimed to improve social and institutional aspects in coca-growing communities 
were frequently underdeveloped and underfunded as part of Plan Colombia (Dion & 
Russler, 2008). Lack of interest on the part of the government to invest in AD programmes 
and other development-oriented strategies is not something new. According to Sánchez 
 
3 All acronyms in the Colombian context are using their Spanish initials 
4 The ‘war on drugs’ is an approach to the drug problem, led by the U.S government, focused on addressing 
drug production in source countries before it can reach American shores.  
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(2005), prior to the implementation of Plan Colombia, the National Alternative 
Development Plan -Plante- (1995-1999), had already removed the comprehensive 
approach that had characterized the first alternative development interventions 
implemented by the UNDOC since the 1980s in the country.  One difference between the 
two was that under Plan Colombia the initial eradication of illicit crops by small coca 
farmers was a pre-condition to receiving government aid (Vargas, 2011). However, and 
despite the fact that Plan Colombia’s design included participatory and sustainability 
components, pre-conditions to access to aid reinforced the coercive eradication strategies 
that were already a central part of the government's counter-narcotics policy during Plante 
(Tabares & Rosales, 2005). Another important difference between these two substitution 
programmes was the change of approach to productive projects. While under the Plante, 
peasant organizations played a central role in the creation and implementation of 
productive alternatives in the areas affected by illicit crops, during Plan Colombia the 
government focused efforts to incentive large companies to support and coordinate new 
productive opportunities through financial investments in these rural areas.  
 
Regarding the effectiveness of the alternative development programmes launched during 
the two aforementioned periods, much of the academic literature argues that, in general 
terms, they have not been able to offer sustainable alternatives to the coca grower 
communities let alone improve their living conditions (Mejía, 2016). According to the 
academic community, there are several causes of the low effectiveness of these 
programmes. Vargas (2010), for example, warns that alternative development 
programmes in the country are not usually well connected with the plans and activities of 
local and regional governments. This affects the sustainability of the substitution 
programmes since there are conflicts between the objectives of the programme concerned 
with those of the regional and national development plans. This was evident during the 
implementation of Plante, where a centrist and simplistic stance toward the problem of 
illicit crops prevailed. During its implementation in the late 90s, and despite having 
correctly recognized the importance of establishing information channels between the 
different levels of government, the Plante scheme did not adequately strengthen the 
mechanisms initially proposed for the coordination and evaluation of the programmes, 




According to Vargas (2010, p. 23-25), the subsequent implementation of Plan Colombia 
further exacerbated the coordination gap between the central government and the regions. 
The distribution of monetary resources directed towards the regions to tackle illicit crops 
was determined by the regional governments’ capacity to process and present projects on 
their own. This became a structural problem of the plan and ended up further 
marginalizing the poorest municipalities and those most affected by illicit crops since 
they did not have the institutional capacity or the technical knowledge necessary to 
develop projects that met the conditions imposed by the national government. 
Additionally, with the strengthening of a criminalization approach under Plan Colombia, 
the government increased aerial fumigation actions during this period, which were usually 
imposed without any consultation with local governments (Ramirez, 2001, p.229). 
 
A similar disconnection problem occurred within the government's own anti-drug policy. 
Several authors argue that anti-drug policy in Colombia has often had conflicting 
objectives due to a lack of articulation among its different strategies (Ramirez, 2005; 
Vargas, 2010). Alternative development programmes, for example, are often 
implemented in conjunction with aerial spraying strategies. This, despite the negative 
effects that the latter has had on the relationship between communities and the institutions 
of the national government (Cruz & Chaparro, 2017, p. 39). This lack of clarity in the 
approach adopted to combat the production of illicit crops, as well as the lack of 
coordination in the implementation of these strategies, often has negative impacts on 
institutional trust on the part of farming families. This is exemplified in some documented 
cases of families who, despite having voluntarily started participating in alternative 
development projects, have had crops erroneously fumigated, frustrating their attempts at 
building new livelihoods (see Huezo, 2017). Scepticism on the part of the communities 
affects their future intention to participate in alternative development programmes. 
 
Likewise, the instability of the government’s substitution programmes greatly affects 
their sustainability over time. Programmes aimed at substituting illicit crops should 
guarantee alternative livelihoods for coca grower families in the long term (reference). In 
Colombia, however, these programmes usually have limited funds and are formulated 
only to respond to short-term challenges, without considering a comprehensive strategy 
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that transcends to the medium and long term (Sánchez, 2005). This lack of continuity 
further aggravates the lack of trust that the communities have in the government. An 
example of this was the case of the ‘Familias Guardabosques’ (Ranger Families) 
programme (2005-2012), which consisted of providing subsidies to coca grower families 
so that they did not grow coca and instead committed to protecting the natural parks. 
According to Vargas (2011), this programme only offered temporary relief to these 
families, which ended when the programme collapsed. 
 
Finally, a number of authors have considered the low capacity of substitution programmes 
to adapt to the local contexts of coca grower communities (Álvarez, 2005; Rincón-Ruiz 
et al, 2016). Álvarez (2005), for example, claims that alternative development in the 
Andean countries has not worked because the needs of the local communities affected by 
drug trafficking have not been considered. The author suggests that a large part of the 
interventions have been ‘imposed from the outside’ and that no one has worried about 
whether the programmes are appropriate for these communities. This view is also 
supported by Rincón-Ruiz et al (2016), who emphasize that the conditions necessary for 
the implementation of crop substitution programmes should match the reality of the 
communities where coca is grown. 
 
In the international context, Buxton (2015) states that the ability of these programmes to 
connect with local communities is essentially conditioned by the current legal framework, 
which criminalizes coca growers. This approach prevents these policies from promoting 
citizen participation and empowerment, which are essential elements to guarantee the 
design of a coherent and sustainable programme. In the case of Colombia, a large portion 
of the coca growing families live in isolated and insecure places due to the presence of 
different armed groups. In this regard, Buxton argues that the presence of the national 
government in these areas should not be limited to exercising control over illicit crops 
and thus becoming just one more actor in the conflict. On the contrary, it is necessary for 
the government to recognize its social obligations towards the communities. This also 
implies that farmers must first be treated as citizens and the future of Colombia’s 




This section has attempted to provide a brief summary of the literature relating to the 
main issues within the AD programmes in Colombia. These issues explain why 
substitution programmes have not been able to make significant changes in the 
livelihoods of coca grower communities. Thus, this paper has listed four main structural 
problems within the crop substitution programmes. First, these programmes have faced a 
lack of coordination between the different government levels in the country. Likewise, a 
contradictory national anti-drug framework, which measures the effectiveness of AD 
programmes with the same criteria as that of forced eradication activities, has been 
described. Third, crop substitution programmes have had low levels of sustainability, 
mainly due to a lack of financial resources, but also because of the initial poor design of 
the programmes. And finally, the literature describes a disconnection between the 
objectives of AD programmes and the local contexts.  
 
Despite criticism, the vast majority of researchers agree that, with the necessary 
corrections, AD programmes represent the only strategy that can bring about real progress 
on the situation of the coca grower communities in Colombia. (Tabares & Rosales, 2005; 
UNODC & Government of Colombia, 2015; Vargas, 2010, Álvarez, 2005, p. 13; Rincón-
Ruíz et al, 2016). Among the different problems facing these programmes, the low 
participation of the different actors involved jumps out as a common element to be 
addressed. In Colombia, decisions and policies regarding illicit crops are usually made in 
talks between the United States and the national government. This reflects a top-down 
approach in the design and implementation of these programmes, in which the voices of 
other actors (local governments, civil society, and local communities) are not 
comprehensively considered. 
 
2.6 Conclusion.  
 
This chapter examined three main themes, which are essential in this research. First, it 
provided some historical and political background on Colombia, its internal armed 
conflict, and the main actors in it. This first part provided insights about the Colombian 
context to understand why coca-production is an important issue in the country, since it 
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is linked to other social, political, and economic challenges of the country. An important 
reflection on the history of the country and its armed conflict is that political participation 
has been difficult to guarantee for the vast majority of Colombians, especially for those 
living in remote rural areas where there is not even state presence. Poverty, the armed 
conflict and the little institutional capacity of the government are some of the factors that 
have allowed coca production to find an ideal place to settle here. In the second part of 
the chapter, the academic literature on forced eradication strategies was reviewed. It was 
argued that these strategies have not been able to offer definitive results to coca-growing 
families because they do not address the true causes of coca production. In the third part, 
the literature on past alternative development programmes as well as their effectiveness 
in improving the livelihoods of coca-growing communities were reviewed. These 
programmes have had important flows and limitations which have negatively impact their 
effectiveness. Among all the aspects to improve, participation turned out to be one of the 
most prevalent. These findings will be considered again at the moment of exploring the 
















Chapter 3: Participatory Approaches to Development 
 
In the section that follows, I will outline the theoretical framework in which the analysis 
of this research is based. First, I will present a summary of the history of participation in 
development theory. In doing so, I will highlight the diversity of participatory approaches 
to development as participation has been an approach utilised and critiqued by different 
schools of thought for decades. Secondly, I will discuss some typologies of participation 
based on academic literature. Third, I will explore the critique that these approaches have 
faced in the last decade concerning their theoretical underpinnings as well as their 
effectiveness and applicability in practice. This latter will help me to make comparisons 
between the ‘red flags’ exposed by the literature and the situation of the PNIS in practice.  
Finally, I will outline some of the principles proposed by Chambers to describe the ways 
participation should be carried out in development. Later in this research I will use these 
principles as a guide for the analysis of the participation and effectiveness of the anti-drug 
policies of the Colombian Government and the PNIS in improving coca-growing 
communities’ livelihoods.  
 
3.1 History of Participatory Approaches to Development.  
 
The idea of civic participation is not a new concept. On the contrary, the recognition of 
participation as an essential aspect in the political organization of our societies, as well as 
a tool for reaching a consensus for the common good, dates back several centuries. 
Current ideas on participation and decentralization are reflected in various ancient 
cultures and civilizations such as in ancient Athens, some peoples of pre-European Africa, 
in religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, and so on (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). 
According to Mansuri & Rao (2013), modern notions of participation emerged around 
the 18th and 19th centuries and have been largely influenced by the work of Rousseau 
and John Stuart Mill. 
 
According to Rousseau’s vision of democracy, participation is not only a tool for 
decision-making – it also has an educational role. Participation allows members of a 
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community to develop empathy for the positions of others, and thus achieve consensus. 
In the 19th century, Mill, following Rousseau's approaches, argued that participation 
provides people with a feeling of self-esteem and belonging (Warner, 2001). He also 
stated that the principle of participation requires all members of a society participate in 
decision-making to the maximum extent possible (Warner, 2001). However, for this 
principle to be fulfilled, he stressed that it was also necessary for people to be formed 
with values and virtues. Only in this way could they positively influence decision-making, 
as well as exercise political control over those responsible for the government (Mansuri 
& Rao, 2012). 
 
Mill's vision of participation was later adopted and developed by different philosophers 
throughout the 19th century. These thinkers advanced the idea that decentralization and 
the participation of free citizens in decision-making was the ideal setting for the political 
and social development of societies. Among these critics of state centralism in the late 
19th century, Henry Maine occupies an important place. Based on his experiences in India 
as an adviser to the British government, and Mill’s ideas, Maine developed the theory of 
the village community. In this theory, Maine postulated that community organizations 
could develop organizational systems very similar to participatory democracies (Mansuri 
& Rao, 2013). Among one of the advantages of this type of organization over that of 
centralized government, is its ability to respond to external changes in a much more fluid 
and fair way for all its members. 
 
Thus, participatory development and decentralization have a common origin (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2013). In addition to this, both concepts share the idea that participation has both 
intrinsic and instrumental value. Intrinsically, participation provides people with greater 
satisfaction with the decisions in which their voices are considered, while also developing 
their ability to relate to each other to reach agreements collectively (Mansuri & Rao, 
2012). Instrumentally, participation allows people to exercise political control over public 




After World War II, community development was the first approach to development that 
included the participation of the target population in developmental interventions. 
Community development refers to development programmes implemented by the main 
colonial powers in their colonies during the period between the 1940s and 1970s. The 
objective of these programmes, in a broad sense, was to improve the living conditions of 
rural communities located in their colonies (and later in the newly independent countries) 
through the involvement of the beneficiaries in development projects (Smyth, 2004) 
 
During the Cold War, the United States government launched community development 
programmes in various countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to provide rural 
communities with an alternative to communism. By the end of the 1960s, however, many 
of these programmes were abandoned as they were unable to meet their proposed 
objectives of social and economic well-being for rural communities (Ruttan, 1984). Most 
of these programmes were unable to learn from their past experiences and faced problems 
of rent-seeking at the local level (Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Korten, 1980). 
 
Thus, between the 1960s and 1970s, the attention of governments and international 
organizations turned to neoclassical models of economic growth, which depended on a 
centralized structure of political and economic decision making. Under these models, 
people's participation was relegated to the simple election of political representatives 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2013). During this period, community development programmes were 
viewed with suspicion by political leaders in developing countries who questioned their 
effectiveness in ensuring either the economic development of rural areas or the change in 
local power structures within communities (Ruttan, 1984). 
 
In the 1970s, a group of radical critics and economists strongly questioned this 
mainstream thinking. They pointed out that the results of development programmes under 
this centralized vision of policies and interventions were limited. Furthermore, its 
negative effects on populations and the environment were not being adequately 
addressed. Among the radicals who most influenced the debate on the shortcomings of 
structuralist models is Paulo Freire, who highlighted the importance of learning 
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environments that allow people to express their needs and thus be able to achieve 
development (Mohan, 2014). This participatory approach to development was called 
‘Emancipatory Participation’, and its supporters advocated for a popular education that 
empowered communities and citizens (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Thus, people could 
analyse and oppose the power structures that "oppressed" them. 
 
The alternative development (AD) approach5 also emerged during the 1970s. Promoters 
of AD advocated for a much more participatory and people-centred approach to 
development (Pieterse, 1998). Like the emancipatory Participation approach, AD agreed 
on the need to empower people in the search for social justice (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). 
Although key elements of AD such as participation and the importance of local 
knowledge were accepted by a good part of the academic community, this approach was 
not without criticism. Hettne (1990) pointed out that AD did not offer a true alternative 
to the mainstream development paradigm. According to him, this development approach 
did not have a clear theoretical structure and, on the contrary, it gathers diverse positions 
from different lines of thought that in practice may not even be compatible. Despite the 
criticism, several of the key elements within the development vision of AD, such as 
attention to participation and the use of local knowledge, to be absorbed by the 
mainstream development approach. This generated important changes within the 
direction of the dominant paradigm, which gradually began to focus its attention not only 
on economic growth but also on human development (Pieterse, 1998). 
 
3.1.1 Participatory Development 
 
Around the 1980s, the concept of participation also had a great impact on how 
development programmes were implemented at the grassroots level. The participatory 
development approach originated with notable scholars such as Chambers. He suggested 
 
5 In this section, Alternative Development refers to the broad development approach, not to the specific 
alternative development programmes aimed at combating illicit crops such as those mentioned in chapter 
two and which are the subject of analysis in this research. 
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that “putting the last first” was the only way to achieve rural development (Chambers, 
1997).  
 
Unlike AD, the participatory development approach is characterized by focusing on 
analysing participation within development projects rather than broader political 
communities (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Thus, its attention is focused on how 
development agencies, professionals and participants relate. Their main concern is to 
ensure that the programmes are characterized by working under a bottom-up approach 
where local participants can use their knowledge to analyse and act. Likewise, the efforts 
of its proponents focus on determining the correct way to carry out development projects 
so that there is a flow of information and reciprocal learning between development 
professionals and participants (Chambers, 1997). 
 
According to advocates of Participatory Development, ‘normal development’ is 
characterized by eurocentrism, positivism and top-downism (Chambers, 1997).  These 
biases are disempowering with the locals since they seek to equate development with 
modernity as reached in western societies where decisions are hierarchized and taken only 
by experts (Joshi, 2014). In rejecting these biases, Participatory development has focused 
on the development processes at the grassroots level, allowing a plurality of development 
goals as well as providing local people with the self-determination they need (Mohan, 
2014; 133).  
 
In practice, participatory development has shown diverse results, which is the product of 
the diverse forms of participation implemented during development interventions. Mohan 
(2014) recounts three well-known examples of participatory development in practice: The 
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (India), the donor’s poverty reduction strategies 
(PRS) during the ‘90s and the case of the Mexican Zapatistas. In the first example, he 
notes that participation was used as a mechanism aimed at creating consensus between 
the community and the already preconceived objectives of the programme. In the second 
example, he suggests that participation in the PRS only generated invited spaces of 
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participation6 and, in some cases, not all stakeholders were taken into account. Lastly, in 
the case of the Mexican Zapatistas, he highlights that there was a political force pressing 
for a different way of understanding development, which aimed to generate changes in 
local governance processes. After considering all these scenarios, Mohan affirms that, 
depending on each situation and context, the nature of participation can vary, since it must 
be adapted to what is either envisaged and/or possible. 
 
Participatory development is usually linked to the implementation of the Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA). Chambers proposed PRA as a method to ensure the involvement 
of local participants in development programmes. The PRA was well received by the 
development community and spread around the world among a range of NGOs and 
international organizations (Chambers, 1994b; Cornwall & Pratt, 2011). 
 
According to Chambers (1994a), PRA is a set of approaches and methods that seek to 
allow rural communities to analyse, share and enhance their knowledge of life and living 
conditions to plan and act. PRA had its origin in the late 1980s and 1990s as one of the 
approaches that evolved out of the Rapid Rural Appraisal7 (RRA) (Leurs, 1996). Unlike 
the RRA, however, the PRA not only recognizes the importance of local knowledge but 
also the analytical capacity of local people to make use of it (Chambers, 1994a). Similarly, 
under this approach, development practitioners are called to facilitate, through 
participatory processes, the development and empowerment of communities rather than 
just taking an extractive and elicited position on knowledge (Chambers, 1992). 
 
These role changes that both development practitioners and local people had under PRA 
had a significant on the development community, especially among NGOs. The latter 
played a crucial role in the refinement and innovation of methods within the PRA 
(Chambers, 1994a). The objective of the interventions was to empower local communities 
 
6 Invited spaces of participation/induced participation refers to those formal mechanisms of participation 
where development agents invite stakeholders to collaborate and build consensus. 
7 RRA is a method originated in the 1970s to obtain knowledge about rural life and conditions. Its origins 
are linked to the dissatisfaction with the bias towards urban development and with traditional ways of 
collecting data in rural communities.  
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in order to create sustainable local actions and institutions over time (Chambers, 1994b). 
In this sense, local knowledge is a resource that belongs to local people and that they can 
share and improve if they are given the necessary tools.  Thus, the role of outsiders is to 
catalyse knowledge sharking to ensure rapport, as well as to be self-critical. 
 
The PRA uses different methods to make it easier for locals to analyse and share their 
knowledge. These methods are usually participatory processes where local people 
interact, share, and analyse their ideas. Some of these methods include participatory 
mapping and modelling, transect walks, matrix scoring and ranking, discussion groups, 
etc. What these methods have in common is that they are participatory and essentially 
visual. The latter removes some of the barriers that prevent some community members 
from fully expressing their ideas, especially if they are non-literate (Bar-On & Prinsen, 
1999). 
 
Among the new ideas that the PRA has brought forward is the insight that local people 
have the capability to recognise their own needs, as well as the solutions to the obstacles 
they face (Chambers, 1994b). PRA highlights the importance of building rapport on the 
part of the visitor within the communities and PRA methods such as participatory 
diagramming and visual sharing allow the entire community to benefit from the shared 
information. In this sense, local knowledge is not only extracted and used by the visitor 
as was usually the case under RRA. Finally, the sequence in which these methods are 
implemented has generated several positive results. First, this has allowed an increase in 
the commitment of project participants. Second, this has facilitated information 
triangulation processes. Third, the knowledge obtained using different PRA methods can 
easily be aggregated, thus enriching the information obtained through each method 
individually. 
 
The participatory development approach, as well as the PRA, have become very popular, 
but have also been widely critiqued. Several critiques of this approach point to the fact 
that there is a lack of attention to the institutional burdens that affect local communities 
but at the same time are beyond their control (Green, 2010). On the other hand, there is 
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the idea that the communities are homogeneous, ignoring the existing power relations at 
the local level (Williams, 2004). The main criticisms of participatory development and 
participation in development overall will be discussed later (in Section 3.3).  
 
3.1.2 Participatory Citizenship and Governance. 
 
In recent years the concept of participation has begun to be reconsidered not only at the 
level of development projects, but also at the level of public policy (Mohan, 2014). Under 
this new scenario, the concept of participation has begun to move towards the concept of 
participatory citizenship. This approach seeks to improve our understanding of 
participation not only at the individual and local level but also from a broader perspective 
that includes the role of institutions (Hickey & Mohan, 2004).  
 
In the past, the gap between citizens and institutions was addressed by taking one of two 
approaches (Gaventa, 2003). Some focused on strengthening citizens' participation within 
the political system to improve their ability to influence the actions of institutions. Others 
considered that the analysis should focus on how institutional accountability and response 
capacity can be ensured. Recent studies, however, have begun to recognize the 
importance of working on both sides of the problem (see Gaventa, 2004; Aulich, 2009; 
Koonings, 2004).  
 
“This reframing of participation as citizenship situates participatory development in a 
broader range of socio-political practices, through which people extend heir status and 
rights as members of particular political communities” (Mohan, 2014, p. 135). This 
extension of the notion of participation as citizenship has found ways of uniting liberal, 
communitarian, and civic republican ideas of citizenship. Thus, the notion of participation 
as citizenship combines a liberal emphasis on individual rights with a communitarian 
focus on belonging and the civic republican focus on processes of deliberation, collective 
action, and responsibility (Gaventa, 2003). The result of this new comprehensive notion 
of citizenship conceives participation as a right, which implies that citizen plays an active 
role as makers and shapers of the public policy.  
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3.2 Types of Participation 
 
The adoption of the term participation by different schools of thought, as well as by 
various national and international organizations, has led to the concept being used to 
achieve different and, in some cases, even opposite aims. Pretty (1993) argues that 
participation has been used to extend the control of the government as well as to develop 
capacity building and self-resilience; it has been used to justify external decisions as well 
as to empower and involve local communities in decision making, etc. To clarify the use 
of the term participation, she created a typology of participation in which she describes 
seven types of participation that can take place in a development project. These range 
from manipulative or passive participation, where local communities have little or null 
participation, to self-mobilization, where communities do not need external institutions 
and they generate their own spaces for participation.  
 
Pretty's different types of participation can also be grouped into two more general types 
of participation that are commonly referenced in academic literature: namely, induced 
(invited or inorganic) and organic (imminent) participation. Induced participation refers 
to participation promoted through policy actions of the state (Mansuri & Rao, 2012). 
Organic participation, on the other hand, is endogenously driven by social movements 
aimed at changing structures of power within society. In this sense, we could classify 
Pretty’s types of participation into these two more general types of participation as shown 








People are told what has been decided and gathered information is 
owned by external actors.
Participation by 
consultation
People participate by being consulted or answering questions. 
External actors manage gathering information processes and analysis. 




People participate by contributing with resources such as labour in 
return for food, cash, or other incentives. They are not part of the 
learning process and they normally don't continue using the 
knowledge provided after the end of the incentive. 











Table 1. Pretty’s Typology of Participation.  Source: adapted from Pretty (1993). 
 
3.3.  Critique of Participation and Participatory Approaches to Development.         
 
The participatory approaches to development have been vigorously challenged in recent 
years by several writers. Cooke & Kothari (2001) grouped some main arguments against 
participatory development in their book name ‘Participation: The New Tyranny?’. They 
use the term ‘tyrannies’ to describe the consequences produced by participatory 
development that tend to be minimized by the development community. In their book, 
they argue that participation has become a new orthodoxy and its relevance and 
effectiveness within development processes are rarely questioned. They identify three 
categories of tyrannies, namely: “the tyranny of the decision-making and control” (Do 
facilitators override existing valid decision-making processes?), “the tyranny of the 
group” (Do group dynamics and decisions lead to less beneficial outcomes?) and “the 
tyranny of method” (Do participatory methods override others with more advantages?).  
 
These tyrannies are the result of not properly addressing and recognizing the limits and 
obstacles that participation and participatory approaches face. Among the greatest 
obstacles to be addressed are existing power relations, which can be found not only 
Functional 
participation
Participation is seen as the means to achieve project goals. This can 
be interactive and involve shared decision making. However, the 




People participate in joint analysis, action plans, and the formation or 
strengthening of local institutions. Participation is seen as a right 
rather than the means to achieve project goals. The process involves 
interdisciplinary processes that seek different perspectives and make 
use of systematic and structured learning processes. Local people 









People participate by taking initiatives independently of external 
institutions to change systems. They develop contacts with external 
institutions for resources and technical advice they need but retain 
control over how resources are used.
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outside communities but at a local level. Participatory development has been criticized 
for its uncritical view of “the community”. The community is often idealized and seen as 
uniform, unproblematic, uncorrupted, and characterized by solidaristic relations (Cooke 
& Kothari, 2001). However, some authors have highlighted the importance of recognizing 
that there are power relations at the local level that play a crucial role in defining the 
course of development projects (Kyamusugulwa, 2013). These power relations normally 
go unnoticed as they are internalized under social norms and culture (Williams, 2004). 
Mosse (2001), for instance, suggests that within participatory development interventions, 
those who are more articulate and that hold a better position within the structures of local 
power are often the ones who guide participatory dialogue and final decisions. 
 
Other critics of participatory development highlight the lack of attention to institutions, 
especially informal ones, which also have a great impact on communities’ livelihoods. 
Cleaver (2001) argues that participatory development has only considered formal 
institutions within its analysis, while informal ones are normally left untouched. The 
latter, according to Cleaver, configure wider structural factors that shape relations and 
conditions within communities. The author also warns that when they are not considered, 
informal institutions can end up determining the most important decisions and 
interactions, leaving empty the formal spaces for participation. Another important point 
highlighted by Cleaver is that strong institutions (formal and informal) are not the only 
requirement for communities to develop. On the contrary, there are also limitations 
related to a lack of material resources or structural constraints out of communities’ control 
that impede the functioning of development interventions and activities.  
 
Development programmes also need to have a deep understanding of contexts and politics 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2012). This attention must be directed at both the community and 
national levels since certain variables are beyond the control of the communities. The 
nature of the local state, and the relationship of communities with the different levels of 
government, play a critical role in the way development processes unfold. Both the 
strengthening of local communities and the capacity of governments to respond to the 




3.4. Principles of Participation 
 
As noted above, Chambers is one of the main advocates of participatory development and 
PRA. In this section, some of the key principles of PRA will be presented, as described 
by Chambers (1994a; 1994b).  The intension is to outline these principles to then use them 
as a guide to explore and analyse participation within the PNIS as well as in some past 
anti-drug programmes in Colombia. Because of the informational limitations of desk-
based research, as well as the nature of the PNIS, only the principles that can relate the 
most to this programme will be presented.  
 
3.4.1 A reversal of learning: In PRA, the outsider learns from the locals. Local 
knowledge is valuable, and it is considered and used during the implementation of the 
development project.  
3.4.2. Learning rapidly and progressively: Improvisation, interaction, flexibility, and 
adaptability are welcome during the learning process. There is no blueprint programme.  
3.4.3. Seeking diversity: The idea is to seek variability in the information collected.  
3.4.4. They do it: Development agents work only as facilitators during the investigation, 
analysis, presentation, and learning processes.  Local people generate and own their 
outcomes while also learning and enhancing their analytical capabilities.  
3.4.5. Sharing: Information is shared by community members, between them and 
facilitators, and between different development agents.  
3.4.6.  Empowering local people: The idea is to empower local communities so that they 
can access the political, economic and social structures of which they were previously not 
a part. 
3.4.7 Sustainable local actions and institutions: The PRA seeks sustainable outcomes 








The purpose of this chapter was to outline the theoretical framework in which the research 
relies on. First, a summary of the history of participatory approaches to development was 
presented. This chapter has also shown that participation has a long and complex history. 
It has been subject of special attention in development literature as well as within the 
different development approaches. More recent participatory approaches have begun to 
reflect on the initial constraints highlighted by critics to enhance their development 
impacts. In the second part of this chapter, Pretty’s typology of participation was outlined 
to analyse the type of local participation that might characterise the PNIS and some 
previous AD programmes in general (Objective 2). Finally, the analysis of the critique 
and principles of participation will be used to critically explore the quality of the 
community participation in the PNIS (and the AD programmes in general) as well as the 
role of this latter aspect within the overall effectiveness of these interventions (Objective 
















Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
This research report explores the current Comprehensive National Programme for the 
substitution of illicit crops in Colombia (PNIS) has been in improving the living 
conditions of the coca-growing communities in Colombia. The data in the study was 
collected through the use of two well-known data collection methods in qualitative 
research: semi-structured interviews and document analysis. In this chapter I will discuss 
the methodology used in this research, how the data was gathered, the limitations of the 




The research data discussed in this report was gathered through the adoption of a 
qualitative approach to research. Qualitative research intends to understand, describe and 
explain social phenomena and the world ‘out there’ ‘from the inside’ (Rapley, 2008). 
Unlike the positivist approach, the qualitative approach appreciates subjectivities and 
values the existence of different perspectives and interpretations of the same phenomenon 
while trying to explain the conditions of these differences (Overton & van Diemen, 2003). 
It also seeks to delve into social complexities in order to better understand the 
relationships, processes and belief systems that are present within societies and 
institutions beyond individual awareness (Flick, 2014). This type of research approach is 
ideal for those research questions that require a deep understanding of people's lives and 
their social circumstances; those to which a quantified answer cannot be offered because 
its ultimate purpose is to understand the complexities of reality itself (O’Leary, 2017). 
 
The above definition fits the descriptive and exploratory characteristics of the research 
question in this report. This report explores the effectiveness of the Colombian 
government's crop substitution programmes. However, unlike the quantitative measures 
used by the government to track progress (namely, the number of hectares eradicated), 
this research focuses on evaluating the capacity of such programmes in generating 
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improvements both in living conditions and in the level of empowerment of coca grower 
communities. The choice of this theoretical framework is based on the widespread call 
from the academic community about the need to adopt a development approach to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these programmes (Vargas, 2011; Buxton, 2015; Mejía, 
2016); as well as criticism regarding the top-down approach that has characterized the 
implementation of previous programmes (Ramírez, 2001; Vargas, 2010; Buxton, 2015). 
This disconnect between government policies and people’s reality requires efforts to be 
made to obtain a better understanding of the complex dynamics that characterize local 
contexts of coca-growing communities as well as their effects on substitution 
programmes. It is in this sense that a qualitative approach is more appropriate, as it can 
capture the intricate meanings and "richness" that reality offers and that might otherwise 




Data collection was conducted following a strategy that combined two components. First, 
the preliminary collection of secondary data through document analysis and, 
subsequently, the conduct of semi-structured interviews with key actors. The objective of 
this strategy was to have different data collection methods to then be able to contrast, 
triangulate and validate the information obtained from the different data sources 
(O’Leary, 2017).  
 
4.2.1 Document analysis 
 
O'Leary (2017) defines document analysis as a research tool to collect, review, and 
analyse different types of written material as a primary source of information. The 
rationale behind this method resides in the proposition that secondary data can offer 
valuable information to answer a research question different from the research question(s) 




In this study, it was possible to obtain useful information on the PNIS as well as on past 
crop substitution programmes in Colombia through this collection method. During this 
first phase of the research, about 60 documents were reviewed and analysed such as peer-
reviewed journals, official publications on the PNIS, policy reports, news, as well as 
previous studies conducted by research centres in Colombia. Some of them, despite being 
useful to understand aspects that affect this programme, were not relevant to the aim of 
this research. The documents that most contributed to the study on the PNIS are 
referenced throughout chapter 5, among them is the 2016 peace agreement (Chapter 4 on 
the PNIS), the most recent UNODC reports on PNIS, the Ideas para la Paz Foundation 
reports on the programme, as well as several scientific articles. 
 
Document analysis was not, however, an easy task. Despite being very useful, this 
collection method represents some challenges for the researcher. First, since secondary 
data is produced for different purposes, trying to use it to answer other research questions 
can lead to problems such as lack of relevance or the presence of author biases (O’Leary, 
2017). Another source of bias, on the other hand, comes from the researcher himself, 
since his interpretation of the information is inevitably marked by his reality. 
 
In that regard, it is worth mentioning that the document analysis that was carried out was 
framed under the lens of participatory approaches to development. The choice of this 
approach to carry out the analysis is justified by the previously mentioned need to analyse 
the effectiveness of substitution programmes from a development perspective that also 
addresses the top-down approach that has characterized these programmes and which has 
already been recognized by some authors. 
 
The use of a theoretical framework sought to reduce personal biases on the data. In 
addition to this, the document analysis was performed considering factors such as the 
author's intention, the context, etc. Finally, as mentioned above, the information obtained 







The second component of the data collection strategy implemented was the carrying out 
of semi-structured interviews with key actors. Interviewing is one of the most common 
data collection methods in qualitative research and can provide valuable descriptive 
information about the phenomena being studied (O’Leary, 2017). In this investigation, a 
total of three interviews were conducted to capture the perspectives and interpretations of 
different actors on the effectiveness of PNIS in Colombia. The study participants were 
selected through snowball sampling and were either workers in research centres 
specialised in the study of illicit crops or representatives of coca growers' organizations 
in Colombia. Interviews with experts have become a popular method to collect data in 
qualitative research (Bogner and Menz, 2002a as cited in Bogner, Litting, Menz, 2009). 
Talking to experienced people can be more efficient and less time-consuming than other 
collection methods and is especially useful when gaining access to particular information 
is complicated (Bogner, Littig, Menz, 2009). In this research, I decided to work with key 
informants, in part, because of the impossibility of conducting interviews directly with 
the coca growers due to the insecure context of the areas where illicit crops are grown in 
the country, as well as the technical and time limitations involved in a 60 credit research 
report.  
 
Working with key actors and highly experienced individuals represented both benefits 
and challenges. On the one hand, having the perspective of experts was useful to 
triangulate and validate the information that had been obtained through document 
analysis. Likewise, interviews were a source of important and, in some cases, interesting 
data that helped meet the objectives of the research. In this sense, the data provided by 
key informants was used both to confirm the accuracy and as a primary source of 
qualitative data (O’Leary, 2017). On the other hand, the involvement of informants also 
required careful analysis and interpretation work to detect and appreciate the biases of the 




The analysis process of the material gathered from the interviews followed the steps 
suggested by Meuser & Nagel (2009) for managing expert knowledge. (1) Transcription: 
In this first step, a transcription of the whole interviews was made. (2) Paraphrase: The 
text was sequenced according to the thematic unit. (3) Coding: Paraphrased text of each 
interview was ordered thematically by passages. (4) Thematic comparison: passages with 
the same thematic from different interviews were compared. (5) Sociological 
conceptualization: similar and differing features from interview to interview were 
categorised. (6) Theoretical generalization: categories were organised based on the 
theoretical framework. 
 
The thematic passages used in the research were the following: obstacles and 
achievements of the PNIS, comparisons with previous experiences, participation of the 
communities, situation of the productive projects, role of the government, differences in 
the PNIS after the change of government. The information collected from the interviews 
was organized taking that order into account. Subsequently, the responses and comments 
received from the participants were compared. An analysis of the responses was made 
considering what ideas were commonly repeated in each interview, the terms used, and 
the differences between each of the interviewees’ opinions, etc. Finally, an analysis of the 




The findings discussed in this study were collected using two popular data collection 
methods in qualitative research: document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 
experts. One of the challenges of working with these two methods was the possible 
presence of biases in the information provided by the interviewees or the authors of the 
written material. Through the chosen strategy, I sought to reduce these potential biases 
and guarantee the credibility of the results by comparing the information obtained from 
both sources. Despite the analysis work carried out, it is necessary to highlight that, in 
some cases, it is just not possible to determine an author’s candour or whether a 




A total of three interviews with experts and key actors such as researchers and 
representatives of coca grower communities were conducted during the data collection 
process for this research (see Table 2 below). These interviews provided important 
insights regarding the nature of participation in the PNIS as well as the obstacles and 
achievements the programme have had so far. 
Table 2. Interviewees. 
 
 
The success of alternative development programmes is determined by various factors as 
well as by the complex dynamics typical of areas with the presence of illicit crops. This 
research does not intend to provide an analysis of all these variables, as some of them are 
outside the scope of this investigation. The objective of the present investigation is a little 
less ambitious, but still significant within the literature on the effectiveness of these 
policies. By framing the analysis of the PNIS through the lens of participatory approaches 
to development, it was sought to explore the quality of the community participation in 
these programmes as well as the role of this latter aspect within the overall effectiveness 




As this study involved the participation of people through online interviews, some ethical 
considerations were considered to guarantee that the actions carried out did not bring any 
harm on the participants, the researcher, or any other individual. Before conducting the 
interviews, a low-risk research Ethics process was completed following the Massey 
Name/Pseudonym Role
Ricardo* Researcher. He has also worked with participants of the PNIS
Paulo Tovar
Coordinator of the research line on "Post-conflict and peacebuilding" 
of the Ideas para la Paz Foundation.
Rigoberto Abello
Technical secretary of the National Coordinator of Coca, Poppy and 
Marijuana Growers (COCCAM) in Caquetá.
Interviewees
*Name has been changed.
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University code of conduct for research involving human participants (Massey 
University, 2017). The ethics process included considerations regarding confidentiality, 
informed consent, and conflict of interest.  
 
Actions were made to guarantee that all these considerations were put in place in the 
design of the research. Concerning privacy and confidentiality, it was guaranteed that 
both the identity and the information provided by the participants were anonymized. 
Likewise, information such as recordings and transcripts were stored on a password-
protected device. Information was only accessed by the researcher and supervisor. All 
participants were previously informed about all these procedures.   
 
Interviewees were invited to participate in this research voluntarily and received an 
explanation about the purpose of the research before the interview commenced. They 
were informed that their participation was not compulsory as well as their right to 
withdraw from the study or interview at any time.  Before the start of the interviews, 
participants were asked if they consent to the use of their information in this study and to 
be recorded. It is worth noting that most of the interviewees were people with professional 
education and were therefore familiar with interviews due to the nature of their jobs. 
There were no relevant conflicts of interest to report. 
 
4.5 Conclusion.  
 
This chapter explained the research process for this report which aims to explore the 
effectiveness of alternative development programmes in improving the livelihoods of 
coca-growing communities in Colombia. A qualitative approach was chosen to carry out 
this study as it fits the descriptive and exploratory characteristics of the research question 
and objectives of this research. The research methods selected also guarantee the 
discovery of valuable qualitative information to answer questions about the type and 




Chapter 5: Participation in the PNIS 
 
After more than three decades of efforts to control the production of illicit crops in the 
country, neither the production of coca nor the number of families that depend on it have 
decreased. Much of the academic literature on the topic argues that, to achieve long-term 
results, a shift in the way the problem is currently being addressed is necessary. Thus, 
instead of viewing the production of illicit crops from a criminalization perspective, it 
must be approached as a development problem. In practice, however, AD programmes - 
which seek to provide alternative livelihoods to producer communities - have not shown 
much better results in Colombia (See Chapter 2). Therefore, it is necessary to deepen the 
studies on these programmes to ensure that they offer the changes that local communities 
have been waiting for. 
 
This research seeks to analyse one essential aspect within these programmes, the 
participation of the cultivating communities. This chapter will discuss participation 
within AD programmes in Colombia, focusing on the current PNIS. It will do this using 
both information gathered from the interviews as well as the document analysis. First, 
current situation of the PNIS is analysed. Subsequently, the role that participation has 
played within this programme (and previous AD experiences in the country) in improving 
livelihoods for coca-growing communities is explored. Finally, it will articulate the type 
of participation that has characterized AD programmes in Colombia based on the 
collected information, paying special attention to the PNIS.  
 
5.1 AD in the context of Post-agreement: The Comprehensive National Programme 
for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS)  
 
The PNIS was established to address point four of the peace agreement (“Solution to the 
problem of illicit drugs”) signed between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-
EP guerrillas in 2016. This programme seeks to provide a definitive solution to the 
problem of illicit crops in Colombia, while recognizing that its origin is linked to the lack 
of development in the territories, poverty, little state presence, and the armed conflict, 
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among other causes. Taking this into account, it was established, by the parties to the 
agreement, that the programme would be closely related to ‘Comprehensive Rural 
Reform’ (RRI) in point one of the agreement, which talks about a plan for the “structural 
transformation” of the Colombian countryside and the coca-growing territories (Vargas, 
Parada & Pérez, 2019). The aim is to dissolve the causes that gave rise to the problem of 
illicit crops in the first place and achieve a sustainable change in these communities 
(Tobón & Sierra, 2018). 
 
In this sense, the peace agreement adopted a development approach to address the 
problem of illicit crops. The approach seeks, in the first instance, to provide communities 
with public goods as well as to strengthen the institutional presence of the state in these 
territories. In addition, the Government also plans to provide the coca-growing 
communities with alternatives and technical support to make their transition to the licit 
economy through the PNIS. These considerations suggested a shift from an approach of 
criminalizing peasant communities to one focused on the comprehensive development of 
these territories with a long-term perspective that would address the problem through AD 
and state investment (Méndez et al, 2019). 
 
The Decree 896 of 2017 determines that the main objectives of the PNIS include 
overcoming the conditions of poverty in the peasant communities affected by crops for 
illicit use. Promoting the voluntary substitution of illicit crops, through comprehensive 
municipal and community substitution and alternative development plans, which must be 
designed with the direct participation of the communities involved. Generating policies 
and productive opportunities for growers. Contributing to the recovery of ecosystems and 
sustainable development. Strengthening the participation and capacities of peasant 
organizations. Strengthening the management capacities of the communities and their 
organizations, through their direct participation in the preparation, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation. 
 
The PNIS is made up of several parts. These components are: the Community and 
Municipal Plan of Substitution and Alternative Development (PISDA), The Immediate 
Attention Plan (PAI), and the Community Immediate Care Plan (Community PAI). 
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Firstly, PISDA seeks to generate comprehensive transformation in the local territories 
through the participation of the communities. This component is essentially related to 
meeting the needs of communities in terms of physical infrastructure, public services and 
security at the local and regional levels. The PAI on the other hand, consists of providing 
financial incentives to families for substitution activities and generation of productive 
projects. These productive alternatives are divided between those destined for short-term 
food security projects and those designed for the sustainability of families in the long 
term. Finally, the Community PAI includes measures to care for children, the elderly, etc. 
 
Despite this ambitious commitment made by the government, embodied in the peace 
agreement, its formulation and implementation have been critiqued by scholars and 
others. Some researchers have highlighted that the programme was formulated without 
taking into account its financing or the limited capacity of government institutions, which 
have historically been unable to make a significant presence in the most remote regions 
of the country (Ideas para la paz, 2019; Rettberg , 2020). The limited capacity of the 
national government to move its institutions to areas that used to be FARC territory has 
facilitated the arrival of other armed groups. The presence of the latter has greatly 
deteriorated the already delicate security situation in these areas, which in turn has 
affected the participation of the communities in the PNIS (Cabra, 2019). 
 
In the same sense, Vargas et. al (2019) suggest that point four of the agreement contains 
contradictory views. On the one hand, the government proposes a structural 
transformation through social investment and infrastructure. On the other hand, and 
because of the international and national political pressure, they undertook the immediate 
reduction of illicit crops by prematurely implementing the programme without a deep 
understanding of the people’s needs and contexts.  Likewise, the government conditioned 
the participation of growers in the PNIS to the eradication of their illicit crops. As a result 
of these changes, the initial transformative strategy of the PNIS was sacrificed and, 




The latter implies a contradiction between the search for a sustainable long-term solution 
and the immediacy of achieving results in the short term, which has already been shown 
in previous experiences to be ineffective in Colombia (Vargas, 2011). Regarding this, 
Ricardo8, one of the researchers consulted and who has worked in some of the beneficiary 
communities of the programme, affirms that: 
 
“One of the biggest challenges the PNIS faces is that it is not targeting territorial 
transformation, it has only focused on investing in families, on making transfers to them. 
(…) As there are no structural changes in the context of these families, only a band-aid 
to the problem is achieved” (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020). 
 
In addition to the criticism of the formulation of the PNIS and point four of the peace 
agreement, there are also some concerns regarding the way in which the PNIS has been 
implemented since it started, as well as during the last two years under the new 
government of President Duque. According to the ‘Ideas para la Paz’ Foundation, from 
the start the PNIS has had difficulties related to insufficient operational capacities, and a 
lack of funding, among other issues (Ideas para la Paz, 2019). These operational and 
financial difficulties have led to delays and errors in the implementation of the 
programme. Ricardo, for example, comments that "there were problems during the family 
enrolment process in the PNIS, due to irregularities in documentation" (R Pérez, 
Interview, May 5, 2020). The latter has created disgust among the affected families, 
generating protests and blocking roads. 
 
Adding to these issues, Rigoberto Abello, technical secretary of the National Coordinator 
of Coca, Poppy and Marijuana Growers (COCCAM) in Caquetá, suggests that during the 
implementation of the PNIS there was a lack of coordination between the members of the 
government who developed the programme and the different government bodies in 
charge of implementing it: 
 
 
8 Name has been changed as requested by the interviewee.  
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"At the local level, there is a contradiction between what was signed in the agreement 
and what was started to be implemented" (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020). 
 
Paulo Tovar, coordinator of the research line on "Post-conflict and peacebuilding" of the 
Ideas para la Paz Foundation, on the other hand, suggests that the lack of coordination led 
to the duplication of programming. He observed that during the beginning of the 
implementation of both the PNIS and PDET9, the RRI's main planning tool, similar 
actions were being carried out by both programmes in some communities. These 
programmes should have been coordinated to guarantee a comprehensive rural 
development in the long term. However, Tovar argues that: 
 
“(The PNIS and the PDETs) started very disjointed: for example, in the municipality of 
Briceño (the PNIS pilot test was carried out here) from 8 to 10 am the participatory 
planning committee created within the framework of the PDET met, and from 10am to 
12pm the PNIS, both meetings with the same participants, the same name and different 
officials. Some participants said it was just the same” (P. Tovar, Interview, May 10, 
2020). 
 
On the other hand, the provision of economic incentives and technical assistance to 
families has been characterized by non-compliance with the agreed time schedules 
(Cardona, 2019). The delay in aid has been viewed with concern by several researchers, 
who suggest that this could lead to a loss of trust by the participants (Ideas para la paz, 
2019). This problem began early in the programme and continues with the new 
administration. The PNIS is designed so that once families agree to enter the PNIS, and 
they destroy their crops for illicit use, they must be granted a one off payment of one 
million eight hundred thousand pesos (only once) for self-support and food security. After 
this, and once the families have designed their productive projects (with technical 
assistance), they are granted - for a single time - the amount of nine million pesos (about 
 
9 ‘Development Programmes with a Territorial Approach’. It is a subregional programme that seeks a 
comprehensive transformation in rural areas of the country. As PNIS, it was also created in the context of 
the peace agreement. It is the man policy tool of the RRI and it is supposed to work in a coordinated 
manner with the PNIS.  
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US$2469) to develop ‘fast income projects’ (short term). Then, families are provided with 
one million pesos a month (about US$274) to sustain them for a year in bimonthly 
payments. Finally, and twelve months after the signing of the replacement agreement, the 
families should receive ten million pesos (about 2,743 US dollars) for the creation of 
long-term projects. 
 
Currently, according to the latest UNODC report, ninety-seven percent (97%) of the 
nearly one hundred thousand families participating in the programme have complied with 
the agreement and have not replanted coca (UNODC, 2020). This is despite constant 
delays and non-compliance by the government. Currently, about 26 percent of families 
have not received any payment. On average, families are waiting to receive their first 
support payment 3 months late, and payments for the development of a productive project 
are arriving 16 months late (Ideas para la Paz, 2019). Likewise, close to forty percent 
have not received technical assistance, and only 1,792 (1.8%) of the nearly a hundred 
thousand families have received a payment related to short-term and long-term productive 
projects (UNDOC, 2020, p. 25) 
 
Some scholars and activists have warned that the implementation of the PNIS has been 
further affected by the arrival of the new government, which had opposed the signing of 
the peace agreement. Mendez et. al (2019), argues that the changes in the anti-drug policy 
made by the new government represents some setbacks with respect to what was signed 
in the agreement. Among these changes is the intention to resume aerial spraying, as well 
as a much more criminalized public policy against the national consumption of drugs, 
which had been moving towards a focus on mental health. For Ricardo, the new 
government "has not finished the PNIS, but substitution is the least important component 
of the new government's anti-drug agenda" (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020). According 
to Ideas para la Paz (2019), the new government inherited a programme with budgetary, 
planning and coordination problems. The implementation of the PNIS continues, but 
there is great concern that the government will default on participating families. 
According to Abello, in the last two years COCCAM's efforts have focused on 




"From 2018 to now, what has been taking place is a constant process of demand and 
complaint for the effective implementation (of the PNIS)" (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 
2020) 
 
Currently, among the greatest challenges facing the programme are the lack of resources, 
lack of coordination, lack of political will on the part of the government, the serious 
insecurity in the areas due to the presence of illegal armed groups and, finally, the crucial 
need to reorient the approach of anti-drug policy towards a long-term perspective, focused 
on improving the living conditions of the communities and not only on reducing coca 
crops. 
 
The present discussion should not, however, underestimate some achievements of the 
current substitution policy or ignore PNIS as the largest effort by the government in areas 
affected by illicit crops in history (Ideas para la paz, 2019). For Ramirez (2017), the peace 
agreement meant a positive change in the way in which coca-growing farmers are 
recognized within the drug discourse in the country. The cultivators went from being seen 
merely as criminals, to being recognized as victims of all the armed conflict, the low state 
presence and the dynamics of drug trafficking. This change in discourse has encouraged 
the active participation of the coca growing communities in the formulation and 
implementation of projects within the PNIS. This has been backed up by the proactive 
participation of the communities, whose local knowledge and lessons learned from failed 
programmes previously imposed by outsiders, have developed and presented their own 
development proposals. 
 
5.2 Participation in AD programmes and the PNIS in Colombia 
 
Although most of the AD programmes implemented in Colombia tend to have among 
their objectives the promotion of direct community participation, few experiences have 
been able to fulfil this purpose in the last three decades in the country. In the last three 
decades, the participation of coca-growing communities and families in the design and 
implementation of these programmes, except for some specific exceptions, has been 
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limited or non-existent. At the end of the 1990s, the Plante had proposed to use 
community participation as the methodological foundation for the formulation of AD 
proposals (Tabares & Rosales, 2005). However, its implementation was characterized by 
a centralist vision of the problem by the government, which ignored the creative 
participation of the communities (Berdugo, 2004; Sánchez, 2005). At the beginning of 
the 2000s, the Uribe government stated that its AD programmes "productive projects" 
and "forest ranger families" were going to guarantee the participation and control of the 
communities over the implementation of the projects. In practice, both programmes ended 
up designing projects where the participation of the communities was minimal, and this 
generated conflicts between participants and project designers (Vargas, 2011). Indeed, 
according to the participants and development agents of these programmes, although 
there was agreement with the community in their preparation, the government did not 
take them into account during the design and implementation (Giraldo & Lozada, 2008). 
 
Considering what has been learned from past experiences, and with the objective of 
offering a definitive solution to coca-growing families, in the peace agreement the 
Colombian government committed to integrally transform the territories of the coca-
growing communities, as well as providing them with productive and sustainable 
alternatives. To achieve this, the main objectives of the PNIS were to reduce poverty in 
rural areas, contribute to territorial transformation, include peasants in productive 
processes and strengthen the participation of rural communities (Vargas et al, 2019). The 
agreement proposed a participatory re-construction of the territories of the coca-growing 
communities (Méndez et al, 2019). Performance indicators towards these objectives are 
also crucial and, according to the peace agreement, the progress of the programme was to 
be measured through indicators of well-being in the communities and not the number of 
hectares eradicated (Peace Agreement, 2016). A point that many academics, and the 
UNDOC itself, have been making for several years. Another important element to 
highlight is that PNIS coverage is national. This, and considering the provision of public 
goods and services, as well as the components of the PNIS, makes it the largest effort that 




One of the five principles on which the PNIS is governed is “joint, participatory and 
concerted construction.” According to Decree 896 of 2017, which created the PNIS, the 
participation of the communities is the basis for the formulation, execution, and control 
of productive projects in the programme. This decree also established some spaces and 
participatory structures to facilitate the participation of families, communities, and other 
key actors within the programme. In the case of the coca-growing communities, the 
community assemblies were established as the main participation space in which they 
could express and build their ideas and projects.  
 
During the initial phase of PNIS, the assemblies were intended to allow participants to 
share their project ideas, as well as their main development obstacles, in order to begin 
building a development path that would fit their contexts and needs. However, in practice, 
this initial stage was marked by the government's interest in reducing the greatest number 
of hectares of coca in the shortest possible time. 
 
Aragón (2019), through interviews with participating communities during this first phase 
of the programme in the Caquetá region, collected some comments and perspectives from 
farmers on what was carried out during these meetings and through the PNIS. She found 
that in the communities she interviewed, despite having a positive opinion of the 
programme's structure, there were feelings of both a lot of uncertainty and mistrust about 
the implementation of the PNIS. According to the communities, during these assemblies 
the government mostly limited itself to recruiting local support for the programme and 
the steps to follow, while being given only two options, whether to join the programme 
or not. They questioned their participation during the formulation of the plan itself and 
argued that, even if some of their concerns and ideas were considered on some occasions, 
they still felt their participation was not important. 
 
As mentioned above, in practice, the implementation of PNIS has faced several 
challenges. All these aspects have affected the way in which PNIS has developed within 
local communities, as well as the participation of the latter in the programme. Ricardo 
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describes the difference between what was agreed and the implementation of the 
programme like this: 
 
“As the PNIS is designed and implemented in the peace agreement, it is very good, on 
paper it was very nicely done, and it aimed precisely at territorial transformation. If you 
compare the implementation of PNIS with what was on paper, they are totally different 
things”(R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020) 
 
However, what was stated in the peace agreement regarding the PNIS was very general 
and did not exclude the implementation of other strategies by the government to reduce 
coca crops (P. Tovar, Interview, May 10, 2020, Vargas et al, 2019). This, added to the 
pressure from the international community due to the growing increase in crops in the 
country, meant that the programme was implemented prematurely in the country and that 
territorial transformation through community participation was sacrificed for immediate 
results. In an interview published by the ‘Pacifista’ website, Eduardo Díaz, director of the 
programme until August 2018, said the following about the implementation during that 
first period: 
 
“Despite what we desire– they were going to measure it [progress) in hectares 
eradicated. That is inevitable: [We had] pressure from everyone - the ‘gringos’, the 
opposition -they speak in hectares, even if the indicator is very harmful. In internal 
discussions they told me "Eduardo, to go out and talk about hectares is to distort the logic 
that we are seeking to transform the territories." Yes, that is true, but political 
circumstances compel us to do so. If I go out to talk about transforming the territories, in 
the end they will ask me, and how many hectares have you eradicated? " (Pacifista, 
August 2018) 
 
Vargas et al (2019), through one of their interviews, found that due to this pressure to 
reduce crops participatory processes were relegated to the background. One of his 
interviewees suggested that, although the participatory workshops were important, and 
56 
 
proposals were obtained from the hands of the communities, these processes took a long 
time and at that time it was necessary to reduce crops. 
 
In addition to the change in focus in the initial design of the programme due to pressures 
to reduce coca cultivation, the premature implementation of the PNIS led to coordination 
problems between the different government entities. The country's institutional system 
did not have the resources or the necessary preparation for the implementation of the 
PNIS to proceed without obstacles or delay. According to Abello, there was a disconnect 
between what the central government had determined, and the capacity and resources its 
local agents had to work with in the communities (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020). 
 
Another important aspect to consider, regarding the participation of the communities from 
the beginning of the implementation of the PNIS, has been the interference of different 
local actors within these participatory spaces. Some of these spaces have been captured 
by intermediary organizations that claim to represent the communities (Ideas para la paz, 
2019). Similarly, armed actors such as FARC dissidents, paramilitaries and criminal 
gangs have tried to affect the participation of communities in the programmes through 
manipulation or intimidation (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020; Ideas para la paz, 2019). 
Several social leaders who have sought to make the replacement programme visible and 
socialize it with ownership in their communities have been assassinated over recent years 
by these illegal groups (Montenegro, 2020). 
 
5.2.1 Participation in the PNIS during the Duque government. 
 
Although the PNIS had already started with structural failures and poor performance, the 
new government's even greater emphasis on forced eradication strategies has further 
degraded the programme (Vargas et al., 2019). The Duque government’s criminalizing 
approach has undermined the idea of integrally transforming rural areas through the 
participation of communities. Although it should be noted that the programme is still in 
operation, it is not being given the investment it needs to succeed. This is illustrated by 
the lack of political will to complete payments to the participating families, who are still 
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waiting to be compensated for their work towards transformation (Sanín, Pérez & 
Crintancho, 2019). According to Ricardo, during the administration of the new 
government, the participation of the communities within the programme has been 
reduced:  
 
“With the Duque government, the issue of participation and consensus has been greatly 
reduced. Everything is no longer negotiated, nor is everything discussed. This part has 
been lost”. (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020) 
 
Abello, from COCCAM, in this same sense, suggests that the new government has not 
opened new communication spaces and, on the contrary, has dedicated itself to 
instrumentalizing them: 
 
“The government has proposed to close spaces for participation for the communities. It 
has manipulated them, that is, they only come to present reports and then leave”. (R. 
Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020) 
 
This attitude on the part of the government puts the effectiveness of the programme at 
risk, since the communities initially entered the PNIS thanks to the participatory spaces 
it offered, and which allowed them to be heard (Sanín et al, 2020). In these spaces, the 
communities had been able to formulate projects and strengthen spaces for dialogue with 
the government (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020; Vargas et al, 2019). Currently, the 
programme is working in a unidirectional way, that is, from top to bottom. An example 
of this is the government's decision to limit the productive options for farmers. According 
to Abello, at the beginning people could propose their productive idea, but now they must 
choose between 5 options: sugarcane, palm, coffee, livestock and cocoa (R. Abello, 







A large part of the AD projects implemented in Colombia in recent decades have included 
a participatory component in their intervention plans. These plans have written about the 
importance of allowing people to participate during the formulation and implementation 
stages. However, this has not translated to community participation in the field. The 
‘Participation’ has been, both involuntarily and intentionally, used as a “buzzword” in the 
designs of these programmes (Cornwall, 2007). This is problematic considering that 
community participation within AD programmes is key to guaranteeing sustainable 
results in the long term (Sánchez, 2005; Vargas, 2011). And even though the PNIS was 
supposed to address this essential flaw within AD interventions, after going through 
different stages of the programme, it was possible to identify that the participation of 

















Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The information gathered through the interviews and the document analysis made it 
possible to identify some of the main features of participation within the PNIS. The 
participation of local communities within AD programmes is essential to ensure their 
long-term effectiveness and sustainability (Unlu & Kapti, 2012). In Colombia, several 
authors insist on the need to guarantee the participation of coca-growing communities 
within these programmes (Vargas, 2010; Vélez & Lobo, 2019; Ortega, 2018). 
 
The participation of peasant farmers is necessary for both building consensus concerning 
the implementation of the programme, as well as the ownership of the process by 
communities themselves (Mansuri & Rao, 2012). In the PNIS, although most of the 
communities began their participation in the programme with great enthusiasm, at present 
they are disappointed and in a precarious position because of the actions of the 
government (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020). Furthermore, some of these 
communities have not felt included in any of the implementation phases of the 
programme, further aggravating the disconnect between the plan's objectives and the 
results obtained so far (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020; Aragón, 2019). This situation 
worries some NGOs, as they fear that the programme does not meet the needs or 
expectations of the participant communities, and they have no choice but to re-plant coca 
(R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020). 
 
The instrumental value of participation has not been considered in the PNIS either. 
Instead of boosting the analytical capacity of the communities and the use of their local 
knowledge, the government has only limited itself, so far, to provide them with financial 
assistance which does not generate any real or sustainable impact on their livelihoods in 
the long term ( R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020). On the other hand, the ability of 
some of these communities to exercise political control over public institutions has not 
been the product of an intentional government measure. In other words, it has not been 
the consequence of a public strategy that seeks to improve the institutional responsibility 
and response capacity of the government. Rather, this has been the result of the use of 
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social capital belonging to local communities, and the accumulation of knowledge over 
time. This has allowed communities to develop organic participatory processes (Ramírez, 
2017; P. Tovar, Interview, May 10, 2020).  Vélez & Lobo (2019) argue that the social 
capital found in some coca-growing communities should be used as a means to guarantee 
sustainable solutions in the long term. The government should support and protect these 
social assets which have been built by some of these communities. 
 
Another aspect to consider about the PNIS is its ability to address internal and external 
institutional limitations that hinder the course of productive projects in communities. In 
this sense, the PDET and the PNIS were intended to work together to address not only 
the search for production alternatives for the communities (through PNIS) but also the 
structural development problems facing their regions (through the PDET), such as the 
lack of basic services and connectivity problems. In practice, as mentioned above, both 
programmes started at very different times and with coordination problems (R Pérez, 
Interview, May 5, 2020; P. Tovar, Interview, May 10, 2020). In the case of PNIS, it was 
possible to identify external and internal variables that have not been adequately 
addressed during implementation and that have negatively impacted the programme. 
Among the external variables is the worrying wave of violence in some of the regions 
where the programme is being implemented. Promoters of the PNIS community 
assemblies as well as members of COCCAM have been killed or threatened (Sanín, 
Machuca & Cristancho, 2019). After the demobilization of the former FARC-EP, the 
government has had difficulties in taking control in some of these areas, which has left 
many families with an unsustainable burden. 
 
Internally, the communities also have limitations that affect participatory processes and 
these have not been adequately considered by the government. According to Ideas para 
la Paz (2019), some of the spaces for participation have been captured by external and 
internal agents with interests opposed to those of the communities. This is the case of 
some members of Community Action Boards, who have had little transparent practices 
during the participant selection stage. As Williams (2004) suggests, it is important to pay 
attention to local institutions, as better-positioned members within local power structures 
often guide the direction of projects. The above shows the importance of paying attention 
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to participatory processes and understanding that AD programmes require a long-term 
perspective. 
 
6.1 Principles of Participation in PNIS 
 
In this section, an analysis of the principles of participatory development within PNIS 
will be made. The latter were previously discussed in section 3.4. This analysis will be 
based on the information obtained from the interviews and the document analysis that 
was carried out. It is worth mentioning that the conclusions presented here do not seek to 
give a definitive judgment on participation within the PNIS in the different locations and 
moments of its implementation, since this would require a greater number of interviews 
and information. Also, and as mentioned above, some principles, which cannot be easily 
related to the programme, will not be part of this analysis due to the limitations of a desk-
based investigation. Only the initially selected principles will be analysed. Despite the 
limitations, the exercise developed allows us to explore, in a general way, how the 
participatory component of the PNIS has been implemented in the country, highlighting 
the strengths and weaknesses found. 
 
6.1.1 A reversal of learning: In PRA, the outsider learns from the locals. Local 
knowledge is valuable, and it is considered and used during the implementation of the 
development project.  
According to Ramírez (2017), coca-growing communities  have presented comprehensive 
development proposals to the government even from the beginning of the programme's 
implementation through different social organizations. Many of these communities, 
Ramírez argues, have been able to do this thanks to their local knowledge and lessons 
learned from their participation in different failed substitution projects conceived and 
implemented by people outside their regions. And although the PNIS initially suggested 
that development projects were to be built by the communities themselves with the advice 
of programme agents, the implementation has been very different. Abello argues that in 
the Caquetá region the communities have proposed to the government the planting of 
Amazonian fruits or the promotion of tourist activities. This is significant considering that 
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the five productive projects managed by the government in the PNIS would never 
responsibly be developed in the region because it is mostly covered by the Amazon 
rainforest (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020). However, the government has not yet 
responded to them. 
 
In the same way, in an interview conducted by Vargas (2019 et al), the interviewee noted 
that “although group discussions with the communities were important (in the PNIS), and 
projects were achieved as a result of participatory processes, these activities were very 
delayed and the coca was not being reduced”. These obstructions to community 
participation, as already mentioned, have been the result of a short-term approach focused 
on reducing coca at the cost of harnessing the knowledge of local communities. 
 
6.1.2. Learning rapidly and progressively: Improvisation, interaction, flexibility, and 
adaptability are welcome during the learning process. There is no blueprint 
programme.  
Due to lack of political will and resources to implement the programme in the way it was 
initially formulated, the PNIS has been reduced to promoting projects related to 
predetermined production areas. This limits the possibility for communities to propose 
their ideas, making the programme inflexible to the different contexts and needs of each 
community and region. On the contrary, the structure of the programme is more 
characterized by a top-down view of public policy. The government has recently been 
closing the spaces for dialogue and negotiation with actors participating in the programme 
or simply instrumentalized them (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020; R. Abello, Interview, 
May 14, 2020). 
 
In addition to the above, the PNIS structure by stages can be inflexible with the 
communities. Some of the reasons for the latter have been delays in the provision of the 
grants promised to the participants, which in turn is the product of financial limitations 
and delays in bureaucratic processes between each of the phases of the programme (R 




6.1.3. Seeking diversity: The idea is to seek variability in the information collected.  
Although no data was collected in this study regarding how the government's 
development agents were working during the formulation of projects with the 
communities, an analysis of the current situation of the programme shows the little 
interest the government has in understanding the different proposals, ideas and concerns 
of each community. Trying to pigeonhole projects within predetermined productive 
branches or offering specific options to coca growers is a limitation for the diversity of 
possible scenarios in all the territories where the programme is implemented. 
 
6.1.4. They do it: Development agents work only as facilitators during the investigation, 
analysis, presentation, and learning processes.  Local people generate and own their 
outcomes while also learning and enhancing their analytical capabilities.  
Throughout the programme, and mostly during the initial implementation phase, several 
communities have proposed productive projects on their own, along with the 
collaboration of development agents (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 2020; Vargas et al, 
2019; UNODC, 2020). However, more recently, communities have gone from being 
excited about participating in the programme to being disappointed and uncertain about 
what will happen next. Ricardo says that “several families are just waiting for the 
programme to end, but nothing guarantees that coca will not grow again” (R Pérez, 
Interview, May 5, 2020). 
 
6.1.5. Sharing: Information is shared by community members, between them and 
facilitators, and between different development agents.  
Due to the top-down structure that currently characterizes the programme, many of the 
spaces where programme information was shared and discussed have been bypassed. 
Abello states that the programme is being managed in a unidirectional manner, and that 
the government has not met with the “PNIS Strategic Direction Board” (R. Abello, 
Interview, May 14, 2020). Meanwhile, several community organizations that have been 
part of the implementation and socialization of the agreements with community 
participation have been discredited by associating them with the new FARC political 
party. It should be noted that the Ideas para la Paz Foundation (2019) has warned of the 
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capture of some participatory spaces of the communities by intermediary actors. In this 
sense, the communities have been relegated and, instead of managing the implementation, 
they feel uncertain about the future of the programme. 
 
6.1.6.  Empowering local people: The idea is to empower local communities so that they 
can access the political, economic and social structures of which they were previously 
not part. 
Given all the difficulties, it could be said that the programme's capacity to empower 
communities has been very limited. Still, Ramírez (2017) suggests that, unintentionally, 
the programme has managed to empower coca growers who have reaffirmed their status 
as people with rights. The government, for its part, took the first step by recognizing them 
as victims of the dynamics of the conflict and drug trafficking, and not as criminals. 
However, it is important to mention that the law that criminalizes coca growers is still in 
force, even though its elimination had been initially agreed upon during the peace process. 
 
6.1.7 Sustainable local actions and institutions: The PRA seeks sustainable outcomes 
sustained by local communities over time.  
Considering its current structure, the ability of the PNIS to generate local institutions and 
projects that last overtime is not encouraging. Ricardo, for example, had suggested that 
several families are only looking to finish the programme, but are not sure if they will 
grow coca again or not (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020). Furthermore, the low and 
financial capacity of the PNIS does not seem to help with this either. Only a long-term 
approach to the problem of illicit crops will provide sustainable outcomes.  
 
6.2 Types of Participation 
 
Based on the typology of participation by Pretty (1993), this research argues that 
participation within the PNIS has not allowed the true empowerment of participating 
families and communities. On the contrary, until now, the programme has been 
characterized by having a very limited participatory component. A closer examination of 
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the characteristics of the participation of coca growers in the programme leads to a 
conclusion that there have been different characteristics throughout the PNIS. The types 
of participation identified were: Passive participation, Participation by consultation, and 
Participation for material incentives. However, none of these levels of participation would 
offer the type of interactive involvement described in the peace accords and that expected 
by the coca growers themselves. 
 
Pretty (1993) defines passive participation as that in which the participants of the 
development programme are only informed what has been decided while the information 
is handled exclusively by external agents. This type of participation describes the 
experiences of some families participating in the programme. In the Caquetá region, 
Aragón (2019) found that one of the communities studied complained that the 
government initiated the programme without consulting them and that the assemblies 
were not decisive. In other words, at the end of the day, it was not the communities who 
ended up defining the projects but the government itself. That same community stressed 
that "for the government socializing the PNIS was only to inform about the plan, 
regardless of whether the families agreed or not." In this same region, Abello comments 
that, during the initial stage of the programme, its organization had to work to guarantee 
the establishment of channels of dialogue between the communities and the government. 
This was because government agents were not complying with the basic principles of the 
PNIS, among these, the participation of the communities (R. Abello, Interview, May 14, 
2020). In this way, although the PNIS participatory spaces seem to address the need to 
provide communities with agency, they end up reinforcing the same hegemonic structure 
where decisions were made from above by those who control power (Vélez-Torres & 
Larrea -Mejía, 2020). 
 
Participation by consultation has also been present during the implementation of the 
PNIS. In this type of participation, people get involved by being consulted, they have no 
power over the collection of information, and development professionals are not obliged 
to use input from the communities. This form of participation is evidenced in the way that 
some programme officials refer to the implementation of community assemblies: “Yes, 
the ideal is the agreement with the communities, but that takes us a long time … and the 
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coca is still there ”(Vargas et al, 2019, p. 127). In another of their studied communities, 
Aragón (2019) highlights that the families complained about the lack of support from the 
state, as well as their lack of interest in several of the issues and ideas that they considered 
relevant. Abello also highlights the limitations that the new government is imposing when 
establishing the type of projects on which families can base their ideas (R. Abello, 
Interview, May 14, 2020). The above examples show that participating families are not 
being empowered. On the contrary, the voices of these communities are not being heard, 
contradicting the participatory principle of the peace agreement and the PNIS. 
 
The third type of participation that was identified based on the interviews and document 
analysis was “participation for material incentives” (Pretty, 1993). According to Ricardo, 
after so many delays and challenges, some families would be looking to finish the 
implementation of their productive projects without any real interest in continuing to 
implement them in the future (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020). Many of these 
communities are discouraged by the poor implementation of the programme by the 
government, which has not provided most families with resources to start their productive 
projects (R Pérez, Interview, May 5, 2020; UNDOC, 2020). Abello, in this same sense, 
suggests that up to now the government has only overseen providing cash transfers to 
families, thus repeating previous errors from previous AD programmes (R. Abello, 
Interview, May 14, 2020). This being the case, some families and communities would 
only be exchanging their work (eradication of coca plantations) for monetary incentives. 
With this level of participation there is no guarantee that PNIS participants will continue 





This study was designed to determine the effects of AD programmes on the livelihoods 
of coca-growing communities in Colombia and sought to determine how effective the 
Colombian government’s AD voluntary substitution programmes have been in improving 
the livelihoods of coca-growing communities. The analysis focused on the current PNIS 
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and was based on participatory approaches to development. This plan follows the 
implementation of other AD programmes in the country, such as Plante, Plan Colombia 
or Forest Ranger Families, none of which has been able to offer definitive results to local 
communities. The results of this study indicate that the positive impacts of the AD 
programmes and PNIS on the communities over the last few decades have been limited. 
They have been characterized by having numerous limitations, such as the context of 
violence in the producing regions; the disconnect between the objectives of government 
plans and the local communities; limited commitments to long-term sustainability and, 
above all, the lack of political will to rethink the current contradictory anti-drug policy 
that favours forced eradication and short-term results. 
 
According to the data obtained in this research, it is argued that the PNIS has in practice  
followed a route very similar to that of its predecessors despite its initial purpose of 
addressing all the limitations that previous AD experiences have had in the past. The 
government has insisted on achieving the short-term objective of reducing coca crops in 
the shortest possible time, to the detriment of a long-term objective that seeks to transform 
the regions and guarantee the well-being of the communities affected by the crops. 
 
The role of community participation in the effectiveness of AD programmes is crucial to 
guarantee sustainable solutions that are sensitive to local needs and contexts in the long 
term. This is due to the fact that participation has both intrinsic and instrumental values. 
In the case of PNIS, the investigation showed that the involvement of local communities 
has had several obstacles. Based on Pretty's typology of participation, and Chambers' 
participatory principles, it was determined that the involvement of these communities has 
been marked by the limits of a top-down approach to public policy. Due to this 
unidirectional vision in decision making, the knowledge, social assets, ideas and 
proposals of local communities have been relegated to the background. The participation 
of families and communities in the PNIS has varied during the different stages of the 
programme, as well as between the different regions. However, in none of the types of 
participation observed, was there a real willingness on the part of the government to 
empower the participants. Instead, the types of participation found were passive 
participation, participation by consultation and participation for material incentives. One 
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implication of this is that there is no certainty that the communities, once the programme 
is completed, will continue to develop their productive projects.  
A rethinking of the national anti-drug policy is urgent. This policy should put the well-
being of the communities affected by the dynamics of illicit drug trafficking before the 
immediate reduction of coca plantations. Likewise, it is necessary to design new 
indicators to measure the effectiveness of these programmes. These indicators should be 
able to measure the well-being and livelihoods of the affected communities, and not just 
the hectares of coca eradicated. Many of the coca-growing communities have developed 
significant social capital and accumulated knowledge that could be very useful when 
building ideas between communities and development agents. It is essential for the 
government to support and aid these communities so that they can build their own paths 
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